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This paper analyses the political economy of trade protection in the context of the factors determining 
the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel imposed March 2002. The paper identifies several 
factors in addition to the official justification stated problems of global over-capacity and the 
penetration of imports in the US market, namely the continued failure to restructure poorly 
performing firms, failure of previous attempts at protection and the influence of the domestic steel 
lobby and short-term political gains to the Bush Administration of protectionist action. The paper also 
reviews several ex ante and ex post empirical studies of the impact of the steel Safeguards on the steel 
industry and downstream steel-consuming activities. All of these studies find that the costs of the 
Safeguard Measures outweighed their benefits in terms of aggregate GDP and employment as well as 
having an important redistributive impact. The paper provides a brief summary of the subsequent 
WTO steel case and the final resolution of the dispute. The evidence suggests that the steel Safeguards 
owed more to political expediency than justification for protection under the WTO rules. 
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In June 2001, the US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick launched a Section 201 
investigation by the US International Trade Commission (USITC) into the difficulties being 
encountered by the US steel industry. The objective was to establish whether foreign imports were 
causing injury and therefore whether they merited the imposition of Emergency Safeguard Measures. 
The USITC investigation covered imports with a combined value of some $17 billion, more than half 
of total US imports of steel in 2001.  
The preliminary findings found that 85 per cent of the steel imports subjected to scrutiny were 
causing serious injury (USITC, 2001). Further, US steel prices were found to be at 20-year lows and 
around 30 per cent of the industry (by capacity) was in bankruptcy with accumulating losses. The 
USITC Report found 16 categories of items in four broad steel product groups to be causing serious 
injury, detailed in Table 1. These products comprised some 60 per cent of EU exports of steel and 
steel products to the United States, worth a total of $4 billion. Many of these items were already 
subject to pre-existing protective measures in the form of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.  
While unanimous in their findings of serious injury being caused, the members of the USITC 
differed concerning the appropriate remedy. Tariffs ranging from 20 to 40 per cent as well as quotas 
were recommended.1 The affected steel companies and labour unions submitted requests for tariffs of 
40 per cent while half of the House of Representatives wanted quotas on steel imports. On 5 March 
2002, President George W. Bush announced the unilateral imposition of a combination of up to 30 per 
                                                          
1 The USITC Report also proposed that further assistance be provided to steel workers and affected 
communities through the National Emergency Grants programme, including effective job training and direct 
assistance with the industry’s legacy costs. These legacy costs comprise an estimated $13 billion of contract 
commitments by struggling steel firms, primarily integrated mills, in the provision of employee health-care and 
pensions coverage. The result of unionisation and long-standing labour contracts in the integrated mill sector, 
they have been a major impediment to the restructuring of the sector. The newer mini-mills generally operate 
with more flexible labour contracts and have opposed US Government funding of legacy costs in the integrated 
mill sector. The USITC recommended that the legacy cost problem should be dealt with by Congress (Zoellick, 
2002a). 
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cent tariffs and some tariff quotas, effective 20 March for three years. These were introduced as 
Emergency Safeguard Measures against: 
Surges in foreign imports … to ensure that American industries compete on a level playing field [given] 
the harm from 50 years of foreign government intervention in the global steel market [in terms of 30] 
bankruptcies, serious dislocations and [20,000] job losses [from the] glut of cheap imports, global over-
capacity and … falling prices leading to falling profitability [and] to give the US steel industry time to 
restructure without harming the US economy (Bush, 2002). 
With only limited exceptions, President Bush imposed protection that was significantly higher than 
that recommended by the USITC Commissioners (see Table 1) to provide the domestic industry with 
‘breathing space to restructure and become newly competitive’ (Zoellick, 2002a). The margin of 
protection was to be reduced annually over the three-year span of the measures. The first annual 
reduction was made on 21 March 2003, when the steel Safeguard Measures were reduced by at least 
20 per cent (US Department of Commerce and Office of the US Trade Representative, 2003). Not 
surprisingly, the US imposition of the Safeguards provoked a powerful response from some of its 
major trading partners, notably the European Union (EU). 
This paper examines the origins of the 2002 US Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel and the 
domestic benefits and costs of the Action. The US Safeguards are identified as being the culmination 
of several inter-related factors: the poor international competitive position of the domestic US steel 
industry; the downturn in the US economy at the end of the 1990s; the strength of the US steel 
industry lobby; and political expediency. These factors are analysed in turn. It is argued that none of 
these factors, individually or collectively, accord with the necessary conditions for Emergency 
Safeguard Measures as laid out in GATT 1994 Article XIX or the WTO Agreement on Safeguards 
which permit the use of Emergency Safeguards to prevent domestic injury resulting from a surge in 
imports (WTO, 1999). This is followed by a review of the empirical studies of the impact of the 
Emergency Safeguard Measures on the US economy, all of which find that they resulted in a net loss 
in employment and GDP. A brief summary of the trade dispute and the WTO steel Panel’s findings is 
then provided. The final section draws some conclusions. 
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1. The Determinants of the 2002 US Emergency Safeguard Measures on Steel 
The US justification for the Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel was set out by both President 
Bush and USTR Robert Zoellick. Their arguments for the unilateral tariff were framed in terms of 
Article XIX.1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. They cited the 
damage being done to the US steel industry by a surge in imports of 16 categories of steel product 
(listed in Table 1) from the EU, China and Japan, among others, and stressed the temporary nature of 
the measures. Official statements also emphasised the extensive use of unfair trading practices by steel 
exporters to the United States and that the Safeguards were ‘launched to restore market forces to 
world steel markets’ (Bush 2002). USTR Zoellick referred to the heavy use of subsidies by the EU 
($50 billion since the 1970s) and China ($6 billion in 2001), the high import penetration of the EU 
and Japan in the US market ‘even though they are no more productive’ and the use of similar 
measures by the EU against steel imports from Russia and Ukraine (Zoellick, 2002b).  
It is interesting to consider the principal factors determining the imposition of the US steel 
Safeguards more closely. These are: the international competitive position of the US steel industry; 
the impact of the economic downturn in the United States at the end of the 1990s; the influential role 
of the domestic steel industry lobby; and the need for political expediency. These factors are analysed 
in turn and then discussed in the context of the WTO rules on the use of Emergency Safeguard 
Measures. 
 
The Declining International Competitive Position of the US Steel Industry  
The international competitiveness of the US steel industry has been declining since the 1970s. The 
primary domestic cause has been a lack of investment in new technologies, inflexible labour contracts 
and increasing legacy (health and pension) costs. There has also been a substantial expansion of low-
cost steel production in many industrialising countries, notably China and Korea, giving rise to global 
over-capacity and increasing import penetration. The 2002 Emergency Safeguards were the most 
significant of a series of restrictive trade measures on US steel imports in recent years. 
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The Domestic Problems of the US Steel Industry 
The US steel industry is almost dualistic sectoral in structure with large-scale integrated mills 
producing basic steel and bulk steel products alongside smaller mini-mills producing batch niche steel 
products. The mini-mills tend to be profitable specialised enterprises utilising advanced technology to 
produce high value added output. Many large integrated mills however, are loss-making producers of 
standard steel products reliant upon old technologies.  
Many of the firms in the US integrated mill sector have yet to complete the fundamental 
restructuring of the sector begun in the 1980s, requiring investment in new cost-reducing 
technologies, the closure of capacity and consolidation. This meant that their high costs stifled their 
profitability and constrained new investment, even during the boom years of the mid- to late 1990s. 
Basic steel production is a large-scale capital-intensive activity but many US integrated mills are 
below the critical size necessary to be internationally competitive. Two-thirds of US output is 
produced by twelve firms, with an average annual output of 8.5 million tonnes each. This compares 
with just six firms taking a similar share of the substantially larger EU market, producing an average 
of nearly 27 million tonnes each (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). 
The US integrated mill sector has the features generally associated with a declining industry – 
high costs, out-dated technology, low profitability and increasing import penetration. Many of the 
most vulnerable steel plants were located in the key northeastern ‘rust-belt’ states of Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia and had been badly affected by high unemployment and industrial 
decline since the 1970s. The failure of the integrated mills to restructure meant that, unlike the more 
efficient mini-mills, they were unable to take full advantage of the economic recovery in the 1990s. 
The strength of the dollar during the 1990s boom reduced the cost of imported steel and steel 
products, leading to increased import penetration in the US market. The United States became a 
significant net importer of steel, reaching a peak of 34 million tonnes in 2000 with import penetration 
of 30 per cent. At the same time, US steel output also expanded: by nearly 15 per cent (19 million 
tonnes) between 1993 and 2000 (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). This compares 
with a one per cent (two million tonnes) fall in EU steel output in the same period and its switch to 
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being a net importer of steel between 1997 and 2000, with import penetration reaching 16 per cent 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001).  
Much of the growth in US output however, came from the mini-mills in the form of higher value 
added steel products; they were responsible for almost 50 per cent of US steel output in 1998, up from 
15 per cent in 1981. The growth of the mini-mill sector is reflected in the average productivity data, 
which rose from ten man hours per ton to four and, in some mini-mills, just two (Lindsey et al., 
2001). Import penetration was greatest in basic steel products that competed with output from the 
integrated mills. These developments occurred in the face of anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
being imposed on US steel imports from several sources, including the EU (see below). 
 
Over-Capacity in the Global Steel Industry 
The United States has been at the forefront of international efforts to reduce and rationalise the global 
steel industry under the OECD High-Level Steel Initiative. At first, the major producing countries 
pledged to reduce global excess capacity by cutting annual production by 115 million tonnes by 2005 
(OECD, 2003a). This figure has since been raised to 140 million tonnes, around 13 per cent of global 
capacity, out of total excess capacity estimated at 180 million tonnes. Excess capacity of 105 million 
tonnes was closed between 1998 and 2002. The recovery of steel consumption, with four per cent 
growth recorded in the first half of 2003, has meant that over-capacity is now falling rapidly (OECD, 
2003b).  
The December 2002 High-Level Meeting launched preparatory discussions paving the way for 
the elimination of many market-distorting subsidies through the drafting of a Steel Subsidies 
Agreement. This Agreement has yet to be finalised and may, ultimately, be brought under the auspices 
of the WTO (OECD, 2003c). 
 
Protective Measures Against Steel Imports by the United States Since 1990 
From a US viewpoint, over-capacity in the global steel industry is primarily the result of state 
intervention in many other countries, creating trade distortions through unfair trading practices such 
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as subsidies, and fuelled by the desire of countries for ‘commanding heights’ industries (Zoellick, 
2002b). The increasing penetration of the US market by low-cost steel imports has provided the 
necessary justification for trade intervention. The 2002 steel Safeguards therefore need to be 
considered in the context of the recent US track record of trade protection in steel. 
The United States has a long-standing history of protectionism against steel imports. US imports 
of steel were, from 1984 to 1992, subject to Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs) negotiated with 
the major steel exporting countries by the first Reagan Administration. Both Clinton Administrations 
responded aggressively to any positive finding of injury by the USITC while adhering to WTO 
disciplines (see Brainard, 2001) such that the VRAs were therefore allowed to lapse in March 1992. 
There followed a wave of more than one hundred Section 201 complaints to the USITC by the steel 
industry calling for anti-dumping and countervailing duties on low cost imports (Lindsey et al., 1999). 
Most of the USITC investigations however, found little evidence of ‘substantial injury’.  
A second surge of USITC steel complaints in mid-1998 resulted from the global downturn 
caused by the 1997 Asian Crisis, the subsequent diversion of exports to the US market and a two-
month strike at General Motors. Although US output in 1998 was down on the record high of 1997, it 
was still the second best year on record (see Griswold, 1999; Lindsey et al., 2001). The US steel 
industry lobbied extensively for the introduction of retroactive anti-dumping duties, a three-month 
universal quota on steel imports from selected countries and the revision of Section 201 to eliminate 
the need for a finding of ‘substantial’ injury. Anti-dumping and countervailing duties were 
nevertheless imposed on steel imports from the EU, Japan, Korea, India and Russia, among others. 
The magnitude of these duties varied greatly, both between countries and targeted firms, but some 
were very large.2 The steel imports targeted by the most substantial of these measures fell sharply as a 
consequence. Many of the anti-dumping and countervailing actions were referred to the WTO and 
subsequently found to be illegal. The steel quota proposal was vetoed by President Clinton in spite of 
a majority vote in the House of Representatives (289 to 141) and Section 201 remained unchanged.  
                                                          
2 For example: Taihan of Korea faced a duty of 58.79 per cent on sheet steel (WTO, 2000a); Kawasaki Steel of 
Japan, a duty of 67.14 per cent on hot-rolled steel (WTO, 2001); Steel Authority of India Ltd., a duty of 72.49 
per cent on steel plate (WTO, 2002a); Aceralia of Spain and ILVA of Italy, duties of 36.84 and 26.12 per cent 
respectively on steel plate (WTO, 2000b). 
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The record therefore suggests that successive US Administrations have had a predisposition to 
‘supply’ protection to the steel industry to reduce import competition. The 2002 complaint against the 
US Emergency Safeguard Measures was the sixth steel case to be launched by the EU against the 
United States at the WTO since 1998 and a further action was launched in July 2002. Many of the 
anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures imposed in 1998 were subsequently removed 
because the creation of the WTO, its more effective Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and 
new Agreements on Subsidies & Countervailing Duties and Safeguards have increased the leverage of 
affected trade partners where such measures are not WTO-compatible. This applies equally to the 
2002 Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel. 
 
The Impact of the 2000 Economic Downturn on the US Steel industry 
The economic boom of the 1990s provided some respite for the US steel industry, in spite of the 
increasing penetration of low-cost imports. The vulnerability of the least competitive parts of the 
industry, primarily the integrated mills however, was aggravated by the economic downturn in 2000. 
This downturn was of a much greater intensity than that in 1998 and necessitated urgent intervention 
if the restructuring and/or closure of the poorest performing firms were to be deferred. This adverse 
impact arose in spite of the array of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on steel imports from the 
EU, Japan, Korea and Russia that had been put in place by the Clinton Administration in 1998. 
The downturn was accompanied by an appreciation of the US dollar during 2000 and 2001, by 
around eleven per cent with respect to Sterling. Domestic steel producers were therefore hit by both 
depressed domestic demand and cheaper imports although US steel imports actually fell from 34 
million tonnes in 2000 to 23.5 million tonnes in 2001 - almost ten per cent of the market. All of this 
occurred during the USITC investigation and prior to the initiation of the 2002 steel Action.  
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The Influence of the US Steel Industry Lobby 
The US steel lobby comprises the industry association, The American Iron & Steel Institute, labour 
unions, notably the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), and congressional representatives from 
the major steel-producing states. This lobby has been highly successful in securing support from 
successive US Administrations for protection against imports during domestic downturns, although it 
is evident that President Clinton was less receptive to these demands than his immediate predecessors. 
In spite of the steel industry’s declining domestic economic importance, its spatial concentration in 
the northeastern rust-belt means that the national political leverage of the steel constituencies in these 
states remains strong.  
The onset of the economic downturn in 2000 intensified the efforts of the steel lobby to stave off 
further lay-offs and firm closures in the industry, exacerbated by the appreciation of the dollar, in 
spite of falling imports. President George W. Bush was viewed as being more receptive to 
protectionist sentiments than was the Clinton Administration such that the protection originally sought 
in 1998 could now be introduced. The consensus among the steel lobby was that enhanced protection 
would provide sufficient leeway for the less competitive firms without affecting the general recovery 
of the US economy. The American Iron & Steel Institute also claimed that the impact on consumer 
prices would be minimal and there would be no meaningful employment effects on steel-consuming 
industries (BBC, 2002). USTR Robert Zoellick however, admitted that the Safeguards would raise 
domestic steel prices by between six and eight per cent (Zoellick, 2002a).  
 
The Need for Political Expediency 
During the presidential election campaign of 2000, George W. Bush promised help for the steel 
industry in Ohio and West Virginia over and above that provided by President Clinton in 1998. With 
the mid-term elections for the US House of Representatives in November 2002 also finely balanced, 
President Bush needed to win the key steel-producing states of Ohio and Pennsylvania where many of 
the affected integrated mills were located. The USITC Section 201 investigation and the subsequent 
Emergency Safeguard Measures in March 2002 can therefore be seen as an attempt to assuage a key 
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domestic political swing constituency. The Safeguards did not address the long-term structural 
problems of the steel sector – a lack of investment and competitiveness – but were rather a politically 
expedient strategy that appeared to assist the industry and appeased its protectionist sentiments. 
The steel Safeguards provided a temporary panacea by again targeting low-cost imports as well 
as raising additional tariff revenue at a time of fiscal restraint so as to fund pledged tax cuts. The term-
structure of the Safeguard Measures meant that the benefits were immediately visible in terms of 
reduced imports and higher domestic prices. The costs however, would be delayed and more 
dispersed. The problematic $13 billion legacy costs – on which restructuring was dependent – were 
left to Congress while the costs of any nullification or impairment and retaliation would be borne by 
US exporters and would not necessarily have any direct link to steel. Further, the domestic public 
perception of retaliatory moves by US trade partners might not be linked to the steel issue at all.  
The Bush Administration is likely to have regarded the anti-dumping and countervailing duties, 
introduced by President Clinton, as inadequate in the context of the 1998 House vote for blanket 
protection and also expendable in the light of the succession of adverse WTO decisions against them 
starting in 2001. From this perspective, the steel Safeguards were not providing supplementary or 
‘double’ protection but rather constituted measures that should have been imposed in 1998. Further, 
President George W. Bush was not as concerned with the legal issues of evidence of serious injury 
and WTO consistency as the Clinton Administration. The predominance of domestic factors suggests 
that the US Safeguards were neither a retaliatory response to the success of the EU and others in the 
WTO steel anti-dumping cases nor an exercise of US muscle given the failure of the EU to comply in 
the WTO beef hormones dispute. 
The steel Safeguards have also been viewed as a bid to secure Congressional support for the fast-
track Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) which grants the President greater authority to negotiate trade 
agreements in return for enhanced oversight by Congress.3 TPA was the principal first-term trade 
legislative priority of George W. Bush and was approved by Congress and signed into law as the 
Trade Act of 2002 less than five months after the imposition of the steel Safeguards.  
                                                          
3 The author is grateful to the anonymous referee for this insight. 
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Exceptions to the US Emergency Safeguard Measures on Steel 
The Emergency Safeguard Measures were not applied to imports from those countries with which the 
US had free trade agreements, i.e. the members of NAFTA (Canada and Mexico) together with Israel 
and Jordan (USITC, 2002). Tariff exclusions were also made for Australia and South Korea, along 
with ‘generous’ tariff quotas for Brazil and Russia, based on import levels in 2000. The principal 
countries affected were therefore China, the EU and Japan. 
The USITC and the US Department of Commerce announced that they were willing to consider 
objections to the Safeguard Measures submitted by US steel consumers as well as foreign suppliers 
(for the exclusion criteria, see US Department of Commerce and Office of the US Trade 
Representative, 2002). By the time of the seventh and final round of exclusions in March 2003, some 
1,022 separate steel product categories had been exempted. This large number of exclusions 
undermined the USITC’s original recommendations, given their blanket application and lack of 
precision at the individual product category level. 
 The broad-brush targeting of the US steel Safeguards had several effects. Protection applied to 
steel products that were not causing injury and/or were unavailable domestically. Domestic users of 
such products therefore experienced temporary shortages and large short-term price hikes, sometimes 
leading to lay-offs and job losses. The exclusion process required firms, many of which were 
relatively small, to divert scarce resources to lobbying. There were also suggestions of bias; half of 
the exclusions (by volume) applied to unfinished steel imports (Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a). The 
USWA alleged that some steel firms increased their profits at the expense of US jobs by sourcing 
steel offshore and processing it domestically. The extensive exclusion process also damaged the 
credibility of both the USITC and the Safeguards at the WTO and in the broader domestic public 
sphere. 
 
3. The WTO and the US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures  
The GATT 1947 rules governing safeguards were dealt with under Articles XII and XIX. The former 
was designed primarily to assist developing countries experiencing Balance of Payments crises and 
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would have been well nigh impossible for the United States to justify. Article XIX is widely known as 
the Safeguard Provision or Escape Clause under which countries can cite domestic injury: 
[A]s a result of unforeseen developments [arising from any product being imported] in such increased 
quantities … as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive 
products … and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury’ as 
justification for the suspension of concessions. GATT 1947, Article XIX.1(a). 
The original Article was very opaque in its reference to ‘unforeseen developments’ such that it was 
open to very broad interpretation. Some of this opacity was removed by the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards, which limits the scope of emergency action to serious injury as a result of increased 
imports and requires that its application is non-discriminatory. Any action can only be taken as a 
result of an investigation by a competent authority (the USITC) and must provide detailed robust 
evidence that serious injury is attributable to increased imports. Safeguard Measures may only be 
applied ‘to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury’ (WTO, 1999). 
The primary justification for the US Emergency Safeguard Measures was government 
intervention and unfair trading practices in many steel-exporting countries. There is certainly some 
merit in the view that the steel industry in many countries is characterised by state involvement and 
the use of subsidies. These practices however, are covered by specific Articles in the GATT 1994 and 
the Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures. A critical issue is therefore why the United 
States did not use this Agreement but instead relied upon GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards 
Agreement, particularly given its claim of international trade being affected by extensive state 
intervention and subsidies. Many US imports of steel products however, were already subject to 
countervailing duties and on-going WTO complaints (see Section 2a.iii). There are strict time limits 
on the application and re-imposition of such duties so that the United States could not initiate further 
action that amounted to ‘undue double protection’ (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001).  
The arguments presented by the United States to justify its Emergency Safeguard Measures for 
steel however, did not fall within the purview of GATT Article XIX or the Safeguards Agreement. 
While they might have been permissible under the original GATT 1947 Article XIX, the greater 
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rigour of the Safeguards Agreement in defining the precise circumstances under which such actions 
are permissible suggested that the US action was unlikely to accord with the requirements of the 
WTO. 
 
4. The Domestic Benefits & Costs of the US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures 
Domestic support in the United States for the 2002 Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel was by 
no means unanimous. Many steel-consuming firms opposed the tariffs, primarily because of their 
knock-on effects on production costs at a time of sluggish economic growth. The US consumer lobby 
group Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC) contended that the new tariffs would 
cost far more jobs in steel-using industries than they would save in the steel industry itself.  
 
The Direct Impact of the Emergency Safeguard Measures on US Steel Producers 
An initial ex ante study undertaken for CITAC, using the original USITC recommendations (Table 1), 
estimated that an anticipated 9.2 per cent rise in steel prices would save some 8,900 steel jobs at a cost 
of $450,000 each (Francois and Baughman, 2001). A second study estimated that steel tariffs of 15 to 
20 per cent would cost $2 billion and save 3,500 jobs – at a cost of $584,000 each (Hufbauer and 
Goodrich, 2002).  
The most comprehensive study of the actual impact of the steel Safeguards is the USITC Mid-
Point Report, published in September 2003 (USITC, 2003a). The Report found that, in the 18 months 
following the imposition of the Safeguards, the US steel industry underwent major restructuring and 
consolidation. This included several large mergers and acquisitions, the closure of out-dated plant, 
substantial investment in new capacity, increases in output, improvements in capacity utilisation and 
productivity and more flexible labour contracts. Not all of these developments were viewed as being 
the direct result of the steel Safeguard Measures (USITC 2003a).4  
The steel Safeguard Measures had a relatively consistent and predictable impact on trade. 
Reduced imports from targeted countries (generally by between 20 and 50 per cent) were replaced by 
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increased purchases of domestic output and imports from other sources. The greatest impact was on 
Tin Mill Products and Rebar, with falls of nearly 63 per cent and 78 per cent respectively in imports, 
possibly because of easily available alternative supplies (USITC, 2003a). The recovery of the industry 
however, was constrained by weak demand caused by the general economic downturn, compounded 
by across-the-board rises in domestic steel prices. New construction activity, a major end-user of steel 
products, was particularly weak. In spite of increased domestic sales at higher prices, firms’ operating 
margins in Carbon Alloy & Tubular Steel, Stainless & Tool Steel and Rebar deteriorated. Margins in 
the former were aggravated by higher rates of protection on its steel inputs (30 as opposed to 15 per 
cent) while negative margins in the latter two actually deteriorated (USITC, 2003a). 
 
The Indirect Impact of the Emergency Safeguard Measures on US Steel Consumers 
The ex ante study by Francois and Baughman estimated that some 74,500 jobs would be lost, 
including 15,300 in steel-consuming industries, as a result of the anticipated 9.2 per cent price rise 
(Francois and Baughman, 2001). The same authors found ex post that almost 50,000 jobs had been 
lost in Fabricated Metals, Machinery & Transport Equipment and over 197,000 in all steel–consuming 
industries during 2002 (Francois and Baughman, 2003). The latter figure is greater than the 187,500 
employed in the US steel industry as a whole. These broad findings were confirmed by Hufbauer and 
Goodrich (2003b), who ascribed some 39 per cent of the rise in US steel prices in 2002 to the tariffs 
with an estimated direct employment effect of around 19,500 jobs. The American Iron & Steel 
Institute hotly disputed these findings and claimed that jobs were created in both upstream and 
downstream industries (Morici, 2003). 
The USITC also analysed the impact of the Safeguard Measures on US steel-consuming 
industries (USITC, 2003b). Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and 1997 
benchmark US input-output data, the study found that the aggregate welfare impact ranged between 
plus $65.6 million and minus $111.0 million, with a central estimate of minus $41.6 million. The 
impact on GDP was a fall in the returns to capital of $294.3 million and $386 million to labour offset 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 A US Government agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, also acquired more than $8 billion in 
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by increased tariff revenue of $649.9 million (USITC, 2003b). Actual tariff receipts were $294 
million, such that the USITC study greatly underestimated the adverse effects on domestic prices and 
imports (Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b). The USITC estimate of the aggregate impact on GDP of 
minus $30.4 million was almost negligible but its redistributive effects were more substantial. US 
Government revenue benefited significantly at the expense of falling private sector profits and wage 
payments, including increased unemployment.  
US steel prices rose steeply in the first half of 2002, notably hot-rolled sheet by 81.8 per cent and 
cold-rolled sheet by 69.4 per cent. The price rises over the whole of 2002 however, were much lower 
– 27 per cent and 19 per cent respectively (Francois and Baughman, 2003). The domestic steel-
consuming industries most adversely affected were motor vehicle parts and some steel fabricating 
activities (USITC, 2003b). The price squeeze in the car and defence equipment industries was curbed 
by their monopsony power and use of long-term supply contracts. Many US steel-consuming 
industries however, are highly atomistic - some 98 per cent of the 193,000 steel-using firms have less 
than 500 employees (US Small Business Administration, 2000). As price-takers, the steel price rises 
had a severe impact on their costs, profit margins and employment, shifting demand towards imported 
manufactures, although these effects were partly mitigated by the higher cost of imported steel. 
The tightening of the US steel market had several additional effects as steel-consuming firms 
attempted to reduce their costs. There was a suspected increase in trade deflection to avoid the higher 
steel duties, whereby affected products were imported via third countries, particularly Canada and 
Mexico. The American Iron & Steel Institute also expressed concern about: ‘substantial 
transformation’ in third countries for customs reclassification; in-bond shipments re-crossing NAFTA 
borders to obscure their origin; and simple circumvention though the false classification of products 
(American Iron & Steel Institute, 2002). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
unfunded pension liabilities from nine steel firms. 
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5. The WTO Steel Case 
The EU responded to the announcement of the US Emergency Safeguard Measures on 5 March 2002 
almost immediately by submitting a complaint to the WTO on 7 March 2002. This was followed by 
complaints from Japan and Korea, China, Switzerland and Norway. The grounds for the complaints 
were that the US Measures breached its obligations under several Articles of the GATT 1994 and the 
Agreement on Safeguards (see Commission of the European Communities, 2002a; WTO 2002b). A 
Procedural Agreement meant that all of the complaints could be considered simultaneously by a single 
Panel. The WTO steel dispute is discussed at greater length in Read (2005). 
 
The Threat of Retaliatory Action Against the United States 
The EU and several other targeted countries had already threatened retaliatory action against the 
United States after the publication of the USITC’s preliminary findings in October 2001 but this 
threat failed to deter the imposition of the steel Safeguard Measures. The EU introduced its own steel 
Safeguards on 27 March 2002 for an initial period of six months, to last no longer than those of the 
United States, as a legitimate response to the surge in its steel imports - which rose by 73 per cent 
between 1997 and 2001 (Commission of the European Communities, 2002b).  
The EU argued that it was also entitled to compensation of around €2.4 billion per annum for the 
lost value of trade concessions (Commission of the European Communities, 2002c). Most of the other 
plaintiffs however, took a more conciliatory stance (Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 2002). The 
intention of the EU (and Japan) to take immediate retaliatory action provoked a strong reaction from 
the United States since its legal basis could only be established retrospectively by a WTO Panel. The 
EU retaliatory measures against the United States targeted products in ‘short’ and ‘long’ lists, the 
former being a specific sub-set of the latter (see Commission of the European Communities, 2002d, 
Annexes I, II). The imports targeted were specifically chosen because of their importance exports to 
key marginal states in the 2004 US Presidential Election. The USITC exclusion process however, led 
the EU to postpone the ‘short’ list of sanctions in July 2002 and then suspend it in September 2002. 
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By this time, some 50 per cent of EU steel exports to the United States had been exempted from the 
US Safeguard Measures (Commission of the European Communities, 2002e).  
 
The WTO Panel Decision on Steel 
The WTO steel Panel published its findings on 11 July 2003 that the US Safeguard Measures were 
inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards (WTO, 2003a). The principal 
findings are summarised in Read (2005, Table 4). The Panel Report acknowledged the merit of the 
claim that the US steel industry was adversely affected by the increasing encroachment of imports. 
The US case however, was undermined by flaws in the USITC Section 201investigation and 
compounded by the imposition of greater protection by President Bush than the levels recommended 
by the USITC. The Emergency Safeguard Measures were therefore more substantial and applied to a 
broader range of product categories than was justified by the USITC investigation. There was 
insufficient evidence to support the case of unforeseen developments, increased steel imports (either 
absolute or relative), causation and parallelism. Even for those steel products for which there was 
supporting evidence, the USITC investigation was not product-specific and failed to explicitly 
exclude other possible causal factors, except for Stainless Steel Rod (WTO, 2003a). The WTO Panel 
was also unhappy about the inconsistent product definitions for Tin Mill Products and Stainless Steel 
Wire used by the US Trade Commissioners.  
 
The US Appeal Against the WTO Panel Decision on Steel 
The United States announced that it would appeal against the WTO findings almost immediately and 
that the Safeguard Measures would remain in place (US Department of State, 2003). The principal 
grounds for the appeal were that the findings were based upon error on issues of law and 
interpretation of GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards and that the Panel was not 
objective and failed to set out the basic rationale behinds its findings and recommendations (WTO, 
2003b).  
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In its Report published on 10 November 2003, the WTO Appellate Body upheld the general 
findings of the steel Panel although decisions on Tin Mill Products and Stainless Steel Wire were 
reversed (WTO, 2003c). The Appellate Body therefore recommended that the United States bring its 
Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel into conformity with its obligations under the WTO. 
 
The Removal of the US Emergency Safeguard Measures & Conclusion of the WTO 
Steel Dispute 
The Appellate Report generated considerable controversy in the United States as well as presenting 
President George W. Bush with a critical policy dilemma amid fears of a major trade war with the EU. 
While domestic US steel users and consumers welcomed the WTO Decision and urged the President 
remove the Emergency Safeguard Measures, there was trenchant opposition from the domestic steel 
industry, among others. The President had until 10 December 2003 to decide upon a course of action 
before EU retaliatory action was permitted. The United States came under substantial international 
pressure to abide by the WTO rules. This policy dilemma was intensified by the sensitive exports to 
be targeted by the EU’s ‘long’ list - including Florida citrus, Louisiana rice, California nuts and North 
Carolina pyjamas along with a large number of steel products (Crutsinger, 2003). The President was 
therefore faced with a ‘negative sum’ domestic policy game that required an irreconcilable choice to 
be made between two different sets of marginal states.  
On 4 December 2003, USTR Robert Zoellick announced that the US steel Safeguards were to be 
lifted on the grounds that they had been successful, that the domestic economic situation had 
improved and that their cost now outweighed their benefit (Zoellick, 2003). The United States 
therefore avoided a major potential trade war and the possible electoral consequences of EU 
retaliation in favour of adhering to the international rules on trade. In so doing, the President was 
forced to eschew the unilaterally protectionist sentiments of the domestic steel lobby and possibly risk 
the marginal steel states of Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia in the 2004 Presidential Election. In 




The US Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel highlights several important issues relating to the 
political economy of international trade policy. The Safeguards were the result of interaction between 
several critical factors. The deteriorating international competitive position of parts of the US steel 
industry was compounded by increasing import penetration during the 1990s, giving rise to a series of 
protective trade measures, and the subsequent economic downturn in 2000. Intense pressure for 
further protection against steel imports arose from an effective lobby comprising steel firms, the 
industry federation, unions and political representatives in key marginal ‘rust-belt’ states. The steel 
Safeguards probably achieved their primary political objective of Republican gains in the key 
marginal states in the November 2002 mid-term elections and may also have contributed to 
determining the 2004 Presidential election. 
In recent decades, the United States has exhibited a predisposition towards trade intervention in 
steel. During the second Clinton Administration, this was tempered by the proviso that such 
intervention was WTO-compatible. The Bush Administration has had no such proviso but its greater 
protectionist sentiments, partly in the interest of short-term domestic political expediency, have 
nevertheless ultimately been subject to the same compatibility criterion. 
The conduct of the USITC Section 201 investigation also raises the issue of possible domestic 
political pressure to find evidence of injury. The WTO steel Panel criticised the USITC for its blanket 
recommendations made on the basis of ‘broad brush’ product categories rather than a product-by-
product methodology. The lack of focus in the USITC investigation suggests excessive haste and 
political expediency to assuage the demands of the influential US steel constituency, particularly in 
the light of the extensive subsequent process of product exclusions from the Safeguards. This lends 
further support to the view that the primary motivation of the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for 
steel was to appease domestic protectionist sentiments.  
As expected, the Safeguards had direct beneficial impacts on prices, employment and profits in 
the steel industry. The negative effective protection effects on downstream industrial activities were 
also substantial however, because of steel’s importance as an intermediate input and led to price and 
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profit squeezes, lay-offs, redundancies and firm closures. Empirical studies indicate that the aggregate 
impact of the Safeguards on US GDP and employment was negative. Further, this was accompanied 
by a sizeable redistribution of welfare from the private sector in terms of lost revenues, jobs and 
profits towards the US Government as increased tariff revenue. The Safeguards may almost certainly, 
although perhaps inadvertently, have increased the cost of the Iraq War to the US taxpayer. 
The settlement of the WTO steel dispute in 21 months demonstrates the speed and effectiveness 
of the new DSU with respect to the previous GATT system. The relatively rapid resolution of the 
dispute is important in both the specific and broader contexts. The world’s two leading traders were 
pitched against each other in an acrimonious dispute that could possibly have threatened the very 
existence of the multilateral trade system. It can be argued however, that the DSU has emerged 
stronger and more credible as a result because the United States opted to back down and accept the 
primacy of the WTO as the multilateral arbiter of the rules on trade. 
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Table 1: USITC Recommended and Actual Protection for Steel 
 
 
 Product Category USITC Recommendation (%) Tariff Imposed (%) 
 
Carbon & Alloy Flat Products 
 Slab TRQ+20 TRQ+30 
 Flat Products1 20 30 
 Tin Mill Products u 30 
 
Carbon & Alloy Long Products 
 Hot-Rolled Bar 20 30 
 Cold-Finished Bar 20 30 
 Rebar 10 15 
 
Carbon & Alloy Tubular Products 
 Certain Tubular Products ? 15 
 Carbon Alloy Fittings & Flanges 13 13 
 
Stainless & Tool Steel Products 
 Stainless Steel Bar 15 15 
 Stainless Steel Rod ? 15 
 Stainless Steel Wire u 8 
 
 
Source: Based upon USITC (2001) 
 u – divided on whether injury caused 
 ? not stated, TRQ – Tariff rate quota 
 1 includes, plate, hot-rolled and cold-rolled sheet and coated sheet. 
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